Syria Key Message Update: Flooding and insecurity drive Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in northern Syria, March - September 2026

Country: Syrian Arab Republic Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Key Messages In Northeast Syria (NES), Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes continue , despite severe seasonal flooding in March that is further constraining food access and livelihoods. Flooding in Al-Hasakah, Ar-Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor governorates have displaced an estimated 6,000 people, caused at least five deaths, damaged or destroyed approximately 2,400 houses , and inundated an estimated 1,500 hectares of cropland. Floodwaters have also displaced unexploded ordnance into agricultural and residential areas, further restricting access to croplands and pasture at the start of the agricultural season. Concurrently, ISIS attacks, localized insecurity, and road safety concerns — including reported targeting of oil tankers — continue to restrict market access and income‐earning activities. Seasonal Ramadan price increases — particularly for chicken and vegetables — combined with elevated fuel prices further eroded household purchasing power, maintaining widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In Northwest Syria (NWS) — particularly areas hosting large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) — Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist due to substantially reduced household income. Heavy rains in Aleppo and Idlib affected over 19,000 people, damaged around 3,400 houses, and inundated approximately 2,300 hectares of cropland. The floods compounded losses from earlier flooding in February, resulting in repeated crop failures that reduced food availability and agricultural labor demand. Rainfall also halted construction activities, a key income source for poor households and IDPs, causing widespread income loss and limited household purchasing power. Localized insecurity in Hama Governorate in late March (including temporary curfews) and intermittent ISIS attacks further disrupted markets and livelihoods. These shocks occurred during the final months of the lean season, when household food stocks are typically exhausted and market dependence is highest. Elevated food prices, reduced humanitarian assistance, and seasonal Ramadan price increases also contributed to constrained household purchasing power. In southern Syria, widespread Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes persist due to increasing population inflows from Lebanon and heightened insecurity. More than 202,000 people entered Syria from Lebanon in March, increasing competition for labor, services, and market supply, and straining host-community coping capacity. At the same time, insecurity increased due to localized clashes, increasing Israeli military activities in Daraa, and missile interceptions, which caused infrastructure damage, casualties, and movement disruptions. Combined with lingering drought conditions and persistently high food prices, poor households — particularly recent returnees and Lebanese refugees — face reduced purchasing power and constrained food consumption. Despite these worsening shocks, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes persist likely due to continued, albeit limited, income-earning opportunities and sustained market functionality. In Damascus and Aleppo governorates, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes persist in major urban areas as fuel shortages continue to constrain household purchasing power , with many households relying on black‐market liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) priced at 2,000 SYP1 or approximately 59 percent above the official price, increasing non-food expenditures and reducing food affordability. Food prices rose in March — especially chicken due to high production costs and Turkey’s temporary poultry export ban — while vegetable prices increased early in Ramadan before easing later as supply improved. Syria’s energy sector remains highly vulnerable to external shocks and dependent on externally mediated supply, with fuel sourced mainly from Iraq, regional arrangements via Jordan and Egypt, and domestic production. Electricity generation partly relies on natural gas delivered via the Arab Gas Pipeline from Egypt through Jordan, but supplies have been unstable. In March, Egypt suspended gas exports to prioritize domestic demand, while alternative supplies transiting through Jordan have remained limited. As a result, electricity outages have worsened, increasing reliance on diesel generators and driving up fuel demand and prices. Although Syria does not import fuel or gas directly from Gulf exporters, it remains exposed to global price movements transmitted through regional intermediaries, sustaining upward pressure on domestic fuel prices. Recent regional shifts, including the initiation of Iraqi fuel transit toward Banyas with the recent opening of the Al-Waleed border crossing , may offer longer‐term opportunities for Syria’s energy sector but have not yet improved domestic fuel availability or prices. Fertilizer availability in Syria has remained stable due to a combination ofdomestic phosphate reserves, local production and

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