Introduction It appears that the full import of the decision of the Federal High Court on 28th September, 2026 which reprieved Senior Advocate, Joe-Kyari Gadzama of the 3-year suspension slammed on him by the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (LPDC) is yet to be grasped by the rank and file of the Bar (and, perhaps, the Bench). That verdict – and the speed with which it arrived – is virtually unprecedented in-class (if not beyond): just a day short of two calendar months, from start to finish. The merits of the Direction itself (as decisions of the LPDC are euphemistically called) have been glossed over in most commentaries, with analysts focusing almost entirely on anything but the constitutionality of Justice Egwuatu’s decision. I intend to buck that trend. My interest and concern is – for want of better words – whether the age-old aphorism of the end justifying the means, has played out – yet again, in this case. Am I correct? We shall see. Background Aggrieved by the said Direction of the LPDC, Chief Gadzama, SAN sought to appeal to the Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers, which, unfortunately, was not possible, because that body had ceased to exist through legislative amendment (military fiat, vide Decree 21 of 1994). His only other option (the Supreme Court) was also foreclosed by virtue of the court’s decision BEN MENE-EJEGI v NBA & LPDC (SC/481/2018). Was that the end of the road for him? Certainly not, as the Federal High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2019 came in handy with its provisions for judicial review. This was how his complaint landed on Justice Egwuatu’s lap (sorry – docket), who rightly applied the maxim, ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy) to reprieve him, as aforesaid. Was Justice Egwuatu Correct? Absolutely. There is no doubt that it is manifestly unjust to deny an aggrieved person (litigant or not) of an appeal mechanism or a means for challenging a decision, action or omission which affects his civil rights and/or obligations. It is only fair and in the interest of justice. Beyond that, it is also tacitly recognised in Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution (subsection (2) of which Justice Egwuatu invoked to justify his decision – incorrectly, in my view. More on this, shortly). Article 7(1) of the Charter on Human and Peoples Rights also confers that right. Both provisions are reproduced (the latter, only partly), as follows, respectively; – Section 36(1) of the Constitution: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such a manner as to secure its independence and impartiality”. – Article 7(1): “Every individual shall have the right to have his case heard. This comprises- a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his fundamental rights as recognised and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force.” As previously stated, Justice Egwuatu justified his decision (at least, partly) on the basis of Section 36(2)(b) of the 1999 Constitution – completely leaving out Paragraph (a) thereof. Needless to say, it is settled that the Constitution should be interpreted as whole – in the sense that, related provisions should be construed together: SKYE BANK v IWU (2017) 16 NWLR pt. 1590 pg. 24 @ 87, SC. Accordingly, we shall set out the whole of Section 36(2) of the Constitution as follows: “Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of this Section, a law shall not be invalidated by reason only that it confers on any government or authority power to determine questions arising in the administration of a law that affects or may affect the civil rights and obligations of any person if such- a) provides for an opportunity for the persons whose rights and obligations may be affected to make representations to the administering authority before that authority makes the decision affecting that person; and b) contains no provision making the determination of the administering authority final and conclusive.” In applying only the provisions of Paragraph (b) of Section 36(2) above, as aforesaid, Justice Egwuatu opined as follows: “The above provision is a constitutional protection against the Direction of an Administering Authority being final and conclusive. In other words, a Direction or decision of an Administering Authority cannot be final, but admits of an appeal to a higher body. In the circumstances where the Direction of the 2nd Respondent becomes final, it is against or contrary to the provisions of Section 36(2)(b) of the Constitution”. I believe that the very last sentence of My Lord’s opinion quoted above is problematic, for the reasons tha
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